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THE IMPACT OF GARRETT v. CITY OF NEW BERLIN
ON WISCONSIN'S APPROACH TO NEGLIGENT




An unfortunate result of many accidents is that bystanders may witness
the terrible results of a person's negligence.' The emotional impact on a
bystander may range from nominal, to severe and debilitating, especially if
a loved one is physically injured in the accident. Bystanders may seek re-
covery for mental injuries resulting from an observance of a tragic event.
Courts across the United States have approached such claims in varied, and
by no means uniform, fashion.2 Initial approaches to bystander claims re-
quired a plaintiff to suffer physical impact along with mental injury.3 Re-
cently, however, courts have been uniform in rejecting this approach.4 In
its place, courts have created a variety of arbitrary rules to replace the for-
mer "impact rule." The "zone of danger rule" and the requirement that a
plaintiff's mental harm be physically manifested subsequent to witnessing
an accident are examples. The rather strict requirements of these later rules
were created to address judicial fears of fraudulent claims and unlimited
liability for defendants. At the time these rules were created, the process of
diagnosing mental harm was by no means an exact science.5 With the pas-
1. The term "bystander" is used throughout this Comment to refer to a person who witnessed
an accident but was not in the zone of danger and did not fear for his or her own safety.
2. WILLIAM PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 54 (5th ed. 1984). "One inter-
est which is still a subject of substantial controversy is that of freedom from mental disturbances."
Id "No general agreement has yet been reached on many of the issues involving liability for
negligence in fright, shock, or other mental or emotional harm, and any resulting physical conse-
quences." Id
3. John E. Flanagan, Comment, Negligent Infliction of Emotional Distress: A Proposal for a
Recognized Tort Action, 67 MARQ. L. REv. 557 (1984). "For decades the majority view was that a
plaintiff could not recover for negligent infliction of emotional distress absent contemporaneous
physical injury or impact." Id. at 558 (citing JAMES A. DOOLEY, MODERN TORT LAW § 15.05,
at 371 (1982)).
4. Flanagan, supra note 3, at 559. "Clearly, the impact rule is destined for legal extinction.
However, where the impact rule has been abandoned, the zone of danger and physical manifesta-
tion rules have developed in its place.. . ." Id. at 559-60 (citations omitted).
5. Waube v. Warrington, 216 Wis. 603, 604, 258 N.W. 497, 497 (1935). Wisconsin's modem
approach to negligent infliction of emotional distress began in 1935 with Waube. The plaintiff in
Waube died as a result of her mental injuries. However, the Wisconsin Supreme Court did not
allow the plaintiff to recover based on the fact that she was not within the zone of danger. The
Waube opinion reflects the then current skepticism toward the mental health field's ability to
accurately diagnose and treat patients with mental injuries.
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sage of time, and improvements in the mental health field, courts have
slowly begun to discard both the zone of danger and physical manifestation
requirements when claims of emotional distress are made. Courts that have
discarded those requirements generally treat negligent infliction of emo-
tional distress in the same manner as physical injuries.
This Comment will focus on the Wisconsin Supreme Court's decision in
Garrett v. City of New Berlin.6 Though the Wisconsin Supreme Court is
sharply divided, Wisconsin remains in the middle category of jurisdictions
by continuing to adhere to the zone of danger and physical manifestation
requirements. The Wisconsin Supreme Court's division, however, has
placed Wisconsin on the brink of change. This Comment begins by tracing
Wisconsin's position on negligent infliction of emotional distress claims. A
detailed analysis of how Garrett has impacted Wisconsin's negligent inflic-
tion of emotional distress requirements will follow. Finally, a recommenda-
tion for fundamental doctrinal change in Wisconsin's approach to negligent
infliction of emotional distress will be proposed.
II. WISCONSIN'S HISTORY OF NEGLIGENT INFLICTION
OF EMOTIONAL DISTRESS
Wisconsin's current method of handling negligent infliction of emo-
tional distress to bystanders began in 1935 with Waube v. Warrington.7
Waube involved a mother who, while looking out the window of her house
and watching her child cross the highway, witnessed the negligent killing of
her child by the defendant.' Mrs. Waube "became extremely hysterical,
sick and prostrated through fright, shock and excessive sudden emotional
disturbances which caused her immediately to take to her bed."9 She subse-
quently died. 10 Mr. Waube sued under the wrongful death statute for the
death of his wife.
The sole issue before the Wisconsin Supreme Court was "whether the
mother of a child, who, although not put in peril or fear of physical impact,
sustains the shock of witnessing the negligent killing of her child, may re-
cover for physical injuries caused by such fright or shock.""1 The court
stated that its analysis "must be approached at the outset from the view-
point of the duty of the defendant and the right of the plaintiff, and not
6. 122 Wis. 2d 223, 362 N.W.2d 137 (1985).
7. 216 Wis. 603, 258 N.W. 497 (1935).
8. Id. at 603-04, 258 N.W. at 497.
9. Id. at 604, 258 N.W. at 497.
10. Id.
11. Id. at 605, 258 N.W. at 497.
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from the viewpoint of proximate cause." 12 The court stated that up until
that point, Wisconsin had followed the impact rule.13 The impact rule de-
nies recovery to a plaintiff unless the plaintiff can demonstrate that he or
she suffered a contemporaneous physical injury or impact accompanied by
mental distress.14
The Wisconsin Supreme Court partially retreated from the impact rule
by allowing a plaintiff who was within the zone of danger of physical impact
to recover for mental injuries caused by shock arising from the peril,
although the plaintiff did not suffer any physical impact.15 However, the
court considered it an entirely different matter to allow recovery for a plain-
tiff who was out of the zone of danger and who suffered emotional distress
only as a result of fearing for the safety of another person.1 6 The court
stated that it could not extend liability in the latter circumstance, because
the "consequences are so unusual and extraordinary, viewed after the event,
that a user of the highway may be said not to subject others to an unreason-
able risk of them by the careless management of his vehicle."1" Moreover,
the court, in finding that the defendant owed no duty to the plaintiff, went
on to state that the "liability imposed by such a doctrine is wholly out of
proportion to the culpability of the negligent tort-feasor, would put an un-
reasonable burden upon users of the highway, open the way to fraudulent
claims, and enter a field that has no sensible or just stopping point."1 "
The Waube zone of danger rule was examined and re-evaluated in
Klassa v. Milwaukee Gas Light Co.. 9 In Klassa, the defendant's employees
negligently caused a minor explosion in the basement of the plaintiff's home
while installing a gas pressure regulator.2" The plaintiff's claim was not
12. Id. The Wisconsin Supreme Court's reference to proximate cause is used as a synonym
for policy considerations that are to be applied in the court's decision to preclude liability after a
jury has made a finding of liability. See infra note 56 for a list of Wisconsin's public policy
considerations.
13. Waube, 216 Wis. at 607-08, 258 N.W.2d at 499. "[W]here there was no impact, and
where there were no subsequent physical injuries caused by fright, no cause of action existed." Id.
at 608, 258 N.W.2d at 499 (citing Summerfield v. Western Union Tel. Co., 87 Wis. 1, 57 N.W. 973
(1894); Gatzow v. Buening, 106 Wis. 1, 81 N.W. 1003 (1900)).
14. Comment, Negligently Inflicted Mental Distress: The Case for an Independent Tort, 59
GEO. L.J. 1237, 1239 (1971). "Courts required impact or injury as a means of assuring the legiti-
macy of the alleged claims." Id.
15. Waube, 216 Wis. at 612, 258 N.W. at 500-01.
16. Id. at 613, 258 N.W. at 501.
17. Id
18. Id.
19. 273 Wis. 176, 77 N.W.2d 397 (1956).
20. Id. at 180, 77 N.W.2d at 400.
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based on physical injuries, but on injuries that were solely the result of
shock and fright.2
In analyzing Waube, the Klassa court stated: "[W]henever a court holds
that a certain act does not constitute negligence because there was no duty
owed by the actor to the injured party, although the act complained of
caused the injury, such court is making a policy determination."22 As a
result, the Klassa court recharacterized Waube in terms of precluding liabil-
ity on public policy grounds rather than in terms of the defendant having
no duty to the plaintiff. Moreover, the Klassa court interpreted Wisconsin's
negligent infliction of emotional distress rule to require that a plaintiff must
not only be within the zone of danger, but must also fear for his or her own
safety.23
Fourteen years later, in Ver Hagen v. Gibbons,24 the Wisconsin Supreme
Court added an additional requirement that had to be met before plaintiffs
could recover for negligent infliction of emotional distress. In Ver Hagen,
the plaintiff claimed the defendant had negligently constructed his fire-
place. When the plaintiff built a fire in his fireplace, the fire spread and
consumed the plaintiff's house. The plaintiff was in the house at the time
the fire started and was forced to flee. The plaintiff claimed that, as a result
of the defendant's negligence, he 'suffered shock, mental anguish and great
anxiety for his well being.... "2 6 The court examined the issue of whether
one can recover for mental anguish and emotional distress which is the re-
sult of another's negligence but which is not subsequently physically mani-
fested. 27 The court denied the plaintiff recovery (but did allow him to
replead) by adding the requirement that emotional distress "must be mani-
fested by physical injuries in actions based on negligence. "28
In 1982, the Wisconsin Supreme Court created a narrow exception to
the physical manifestation requirement in La Fleur v. Mosher.29 In La
Fleur, a fourteen year-old girl was negligently confined in a police station
jail cell for thirteen hours without food or water. The plaintiff in La Fleur
21. Id.
22. Id. at 183, 77 N.W.2d at 401.
23. Id. at 187, 77 N.W.2d at 403-04. The Klassa court stated that even though the person
sustaining the shock was in the field of potential danger, if the shock was solely the result of fear
for another's safety, there could be a finding of non-liability based on policy reasons. Id. at 187,
N.W.2d at 403.
24. 47 Wis. 2d 220, 177 N.W.2d 83 (1970).
25. Id. at 221, 177 N.W.2d at 83.
26. Id. (emphasis in the original).
27. Id. at 221-22, 177 N.W.2d at 84.
28. Id. at 227, 177 N.W.2d at 86.
29. 109 Wis. 2d 112, 325 N.W.2d 314 (1982).
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was allowed to recover on her claim for negligent infliction of emotional
distress despite not having suffered physical manifestations of her mental
injury.30 The majority stated that physical manifestations of emotional dis-
tress are required because this is the "tool" which allows the court to distin-
guish valid from fraudulent claims of emotional injury.31 La Fleur
generally affirmed the physical manifestation requirement, but created a
narrow exception for cases involving negligent confinement.3 2 The majority
reasoned that negligent confinement, by its very nature, subject to an in-
dependent set of requirements, would act as the guarantee that the plain-
tiff's emotional distress was genuine, even though there were no physical
manifestations of the emotional distress.33
In summary, the Wisconsin Supreme Court has, in this series of cases,
created a limited duty to a plaintiff whose claim is based on negligent inflic-
tion of emotional distress by requiring a plaintiff to: (1) be in the zone of
danger; (2) fear for his or her own safety; and (3) have physical manifesta-
tions of his or her mental injuries. The only exception to these require-
ments is the narrow exception limited to negligent confinement, where the
very nature of the tort can act as proof of the plaintiff's emotional distress.
However, the Wisconsin Supreme Court, in 1984, created what can best be
described as a second "exception" to the traditional requirements of negli-
gent infliction of emotional distress in Garrett v. City of New Berlin.34
III. GARRETT V. CITY OF NEW BERLIN
A. Facts
In 1981, thirteen year-old Raymond Garrett and his fourteen year-old
sister Connie were on the edge of the grounds on the inside of the 15 Out-
door Theater watching a movie.3 5 Connie was leaning against a fence at the
30. Id. at 114, 325 N.W.2d at 315. "The plaintiff suffered no physical injuries but was diag-
nosed by a psychiatrist as having suffered a traumatic neurosis as a result of the confinement." Id.
31. Id at 118, 325 N.W.2d at 317.
32. Id. at 119, 325 N.W.2d at 317.
33. Id. at 120, 325 N.W.2d at 318. The following standard of liability must be met in order
for an injured plaintiff to recover for emotional distress caused by negligent confinement:
(1) the defendant must have been negligent in confining the plaintiff;
(2) the confinement must be for a substantial period of time;
(3) the circumstances surrounding the confinement must be such that a reasonably consti-
tuted person would be emotionally harmed;
(4) the confinement must be a substantial factor in causing the emotional distress; and
(5) the resulting emotional distress must be severe.
Id.
34. 122 Wis. 2d 223, 362 N.W.2d 137 (1985).
35. Garrett v. City of New Berlin, 122 Wis. 2d 223, 226, 362 N.W.2d 137, 139 (1985).
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edge of the theater premises.a6 Raymond was about fifteen feet away, lying
on a blanket near a gravel driveway.37 At about 10:45 p.m., a squad car
driven by a City of New Berlin police officer entered the theater premises
through the exit with its headlights extinguished.3 8 The officer swept the
fence area with his spotlight and accelerated in pursuit of the children he
had observed. 39 The officer, driving without his lights on, ran over Ray-
mond and caused him severe and permanent injuries."
Connie witnessed the squad car run over Raymond. However, she was
never closer to the squad car than fifteen or twenty feet.41 Connie ran over
to where Raymond was lying, saw his twisted and bloody legs, and became
upset.4 2 Connie sustained no direct physical injuries as a result of the colli-
sion and never feared for her own safety.43
Connie Garrett filed suit against the City of New Berlin and the theater
owner, seeking recovery for her alleged severe emotional shock and distress
as a result of witnessing the injury to her brother.' The defendants filed a
motion for summary judgment against Connie Garrett's claim. The trial
court granted the summary judgment motion since Connie was not within
the zone of danger at the time of the accident and did not fear for her own
safety. In addition, the trial court noted that the record demonstrated that
Connie sustained no physical injury accompanying her claim for emotional
distress.45
B. The Plurality Opinion
The Wisconsin Supreme Court, in a plurality opinion, reversed the trial
court.46 Justice Callow's opinion first dealt with the issue of whether a per-




39. Id. When the police officer pointed his spotlight at the children, Connie remained still




43. Id. at 226-27, 362 N.W.2d at 139.
44. Id. at 227, 362 N.W.2d at 140. "In her deposition, Connie's testimony concerning her
immediate post-accident behavior evidenced a state of hysteria. In addition, she claimed she later
suffered other psychological and physical problems including insomnia, disruption of her relation-
ship with her family, lowering of her grades in school, and deterioration of her self-image." Id.
45. Id. at 228, 362 N.W.2d at 140.
46. Justice Day and Justice Steinmetz supported the opinion written by Justice Callow. Chief
Justice Heffernan wrote a concurring opinion which was supported by Justice Abrahamson and
Justice Bablitch. The lone dissenter was Justice Ceci.
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tion of emotional distress resulting from witnessing a sibling being injured
in an accident.47 The majority noted4" that the parties framed the issue in
terms of a choice between Waube's zone of danger rule and the test set forth
in Dillon v. Legg.49 In Dillon, the California Supreme Court rejected the
zone of danger rule and adopted a "foreseeability" test which established
three criteria for determining liability: "(1) Whether [the] plaintiff was
located near the scene of the accident... (2) Whether the shock resulted
from a direct emotional impact upon [the] plaintiff from the sensory and
contemporaneous observance of the accident... (3) Whether [the] plaintiff
and the victim were closely related ....
While the battle lines appeared to be clearly drawn, Justice Callow took
a different tack in deciding this case. Instead of choosing between Waube
or Dillon, he did "not find it necessary to decide whether the Waube rule
should be modified or abandoned since [he] conclude[d] that Waube [was]
inapposite to the facts."51 Justice Callow distinguished Waube from Gar-
rett. He viewed Waube as involving a plaintiff who was an "observer not
directly involved in the tortious activity who sought to recover for emo-
tional distress suffered as a result of witnessing an accident."52 On the
other hand, Justice Callow viewed Garrett as involving a plaintiff who was
"not merely an observer ... [but] an object of the police officer's [tortious]
activities since [Connie] was a member of the group of children he was
pursuing.'5 3
This distinction is very important in understanding Justice Callow's rea-
soning. Since Connie was the object of the police officer's tortious activities,
Justice Callow did not examine whether Connie was in the zone of danger
or feared for her own safety.5 4
After distinguishing Garrett from Waube, Justice Callow next consid-
ered whether the public policy considerations enunciated in Morgan v.
Pennsylvania General Insurance Co. 5 would preclude Connie Garrett from
47. Garrett, 122 Wis. 2d at 228-29, 362 N.W.2d at 140.
48. Id. at 229, 231, 362 N.W.2d at 141-42.
49. 441 P.2d 912 (1968).




54. It is unclear whether Connie's being the "object" of the tortious activity satisfied the zone
of danger and fear for one's own safety requirements or precluded the application of these criteria
to the Garrett facts.
55. 87 Wis. 2d 723, 275 N.W.2d 660 (1979).
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maintaining a cause of action for emotional distress.16 Justice Callow con-
cluded that public policy did not prohibit Connie from maintaining an ac-
tion for emotional distress because: (1) Connie observed the traumatic
injuries suffered by Raymond from a distance of fifteen or twenty feet; (2)
Connie was close enough to see the squad car run over Raymond and to
witness his resulting injuries and severe pain; and (3) Connie was Ray-
mond's older sister.5 7 Justice Callow went on to state that allowing Connie
to recover would not be likely to "open the way for fraudulent claims or...
enter a field with no sensible stopping point."5" Therefore, Justice Callow
concluded that "under the facts presented in this case Connie Garrett may
maintain an action to recover for the emotional distress she suffered as a
result of seeing her brother injured."5 9
Since Connie's claim for relief would not be barred by the zone of dan-
ger and fear for one's own safety requirements or by public policy consider-
ations, Justice Callow next examined whether Connie suffered any physical
manifestations of her emotional distress. Justice Callow declined to abolish
the physical manifestation requirement because he believed that it was still
"necessary in order to avoid flooding the courts with fraudulent or trivial
claims."'  Justice Callow reasoned that "[w]hen the emotional distress is
manifested by physical injuries, it is more probable that the claimed distress
is genuine. ,61 In Connie's deposition, she testified to "post-accident behav-
ior which evidenced a state of hysteria at the scene of the accident."
62
Moreover, Connie "claimed she suffered insomnia for two months and ex-
56. Garrett, 122 Wis. 2d at 233, 362 N.W.2d at 143. The Morgan court stated that [s]ome of
the public policy reasons for not imposing liability despite a finding of negligence as a substantial
factor producing injury are:
(1) the injury is too remote from the negligence; or
(2) the injury is too wholly out of proportion to the culpability of the negligent tort-feasor;
or
(3) in retrospect it appears too highly extraordinary that the negligence should have
brought about the harm; or
(4) because allowance of recovery would place too unreasonable a burden on the negligent
tort-feasor; or
(5) because allowance of recovery would be too likely to open the way for fraudulent
claims; or
(6) allowance of recovery would enter a field that has no sensible or just stopping point.
Morgan, 87 Wis. 2d at 737, 275 N.W.2d at 667.
57. Garrett, 122 Wis. 2d at 234, 362 N.W.2d at 143.
58. Id.
59. Id.
60. See id. at 235-36, 362 N.W.2d at 144 (citing La Fleur v. Mosher, 109 Wis. 2d 112, 118,
325 N.W.2d 314, 317 (1982)).
61. Id. at 236, 362 N.W.2d at 144.
62. Id.
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perienced a disruption of her relationship with her family, a drop in her
school grades, and a deterioration of her self-image." 63 Justice Callow con-
sidered it doubtful that a drop in Connie's grades, a disruption of her family
relationship, or a lowering of her self-image could constitute physical mani-
festations of her emotional distress. 6" However, "while insomnia alone may
not be a sufficient physical manifestation of emotional distress, insomnia
coupled with some other physical symptom may be sufficient."6 5 By con-
sulting two medical dictionaries, Justice Callow concluded that "hysteria"
was a recognized physical manifestation of emotional distress. 66 Therefore,
Justice Callow concluded that the granting of summary judgment by the
trial court against Connie Garrett on the issue of physical manifestations of
her injury was not appropriate and remanded the matter to the trial court
for further proceedings.
C. The Concurring Opinion
Chief Justice Heffernan, who wrote the concurring opinion in Garrett,
took issue with the majority's efforts to distinguish Garrett from Waube.67
In addition, the Chief Justice disagreed with Justice Callow's characteriza-
tion of Garrett as an exception to the zone of danger rule.68
Chief Justice Heffernan argued that the "zone of danger theory has no
place in modem Wisconsin negligence law. It is absolutely clear that...
where there is negligence, cause in fact (substantial factor), proximate
cause, and injury, there is liability."69 According to Chief Justice Heifer-
nan, the zone of danger requirement falls out of the analysis because "there
is liability in respect to anyone who is in fact injured by the negligence."70
63. Id.
64. Id
65. Id at 237, 362 N.W.2d at 145.
66. Id at 236, 362 N.W.2d at 144. The majority cited two medical dictionaries. The first
defined "hysteria" as "a chronic neurosis, or psychoneurosis, characterized by conversion of anxi-
ety into physical symptoms. It is marked by symptoms of the most varied character, from simple
nervous instability and attacks of emotional excitement, with causeless crying or laughing, to
convulsions, muscular contractures, vasomotor, trophic, and psychic disorders." STEDMAN'S
MEDICAL DICTIONARY 782 (2d Lawyers' Ed. 1966). The second defined "hysteria" as "[a] type
of mental condition, technically a psychoneurosis, in which exaggerated emotions become trans-
formed into physical manifestations ..... ATTORNEys' DICTIONARY OF MEDICINE AND WORD
FINDER H-142 (1984).
67. Garrett, 122 Wis. 2d at 239, 362 N.W.2d at 145.
68. Id. Chief Justice Heffernan labeled Justice Callow's opinion as an "exception." How-
ever, Justice Callow did not label his holding an exception or otherwise. The dissent considered
Justice Callow's holding a deterioration of the existing negligent infliction of emotional distress
requirements. Id. at 243, 362 N.W.2d at 147 (Ceci, J., dissenting).
69. Id. at 239, 362 N.W.2d at 145.
70. Id.
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The concurring opinion further stated that the zone of danger rule was "ar-
tificial" because "in the event a plaintiff is injured in any way, that plaintiff
is in fact within the zone of danger."71
Moreover, Chief Justice Hefferan, quoting the dissent in Ver Hagen v.
Gibbons72 argued that negligently inflicted emotional distress should be
compensable "regardless of whether this emotional distress was subse-
quently physically manifested.""3 The Chief Justice continued by saying
that "[w]hether there is in fact emotional injury or a compensable distress is
a matter of proof under normal evidentiary principles."'74
Furthermore, the concurring opinion also favored abandoning the re-
quirement that a plaintiff must fear for his or her own safety to recover for
negligently inflicted emotional distress. Chief Justice Heffernan argued that
the rationale behind allowing a plaintiff who is in the zone of danger to
recover is based on the plaintiff's fear for his or her own safety, but that the
zone of danger and fear for one's own safety requirements were often "irrel-
evant to the claims that have arisen and alien to the characteristics of nor-
mal human beings.""5 "It is beyond the realm of reason and experience to
conclude that emotional distress cannot, as a matter of law, result unless
there is danger of physical impact to the plaintiff or there is a physical man-
ifestation of the emotional distress."76 As a result of this analysis, the con-
curring opinion would specifically overrule Waube. The Chief Justice
summarized the concurring view by stating that "[i]f there is the requisite
sequence of negligence, causation, and damages-whether physical, emo-
tional, or both-there ordinarily should be liability."77 Whether this liabil-
ity should be prohibited by the court, based on public policy considerations,
should be a case-by-case determination.7"
D. The Dissenting Opinion
Justice Ceci, the lone dissenter, disagreed with both the reasoning and
the result of Justice Callow's opinion. Moreover, Justice Ceci argued
71. Id. at 239, 362 N.W.2d at 145-46.
72. 47 Wis. 2d 220, 177 N.W.2d 83 (1970).
73. Garrett, 122 Wis. 2d at 240, 362 N.W.2d at 146 (quoting Ver Hagen, 47 Wis. 2d at 228,
177 N.W.2d at 87 (Wilkie, J., dissenting)).
74. Id.
75. Id. at 241, 362 N.W.2d at 146.
76. Id. at 242, 362 N.W.2d at 147.
77. Id. at 241, 362 N.W.2d at 146.
78. Id. at 242, 362 N.W.2d at 147.
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against any deterioration of the zone of danger rule as set forth in Waube
and modified in Klassa.7 9
The dissenting opinion first examined Justice Callow's conclusion that
Waube was inapposite to the facts of Garrett because Connie Garrett was
the "object of the police officers activities since she was a member of the
group of children he was pursuing." 80 Justice Ceci argued that Waube and
Garrett were "indistinguishable," and that Justice Callow's characterization
of the facts was misleading because it "implies that Connie fled from the
scene of the accident with her friends and that she was pursued by the po-
lice officer.""1 Justice Ceci focused on the fact that when the police officer
pointed his spotlight at the area where several of the children were stand-
ing, although several fled, Connie remained still.82 The officer then pursued
only those children who were running. 3 Based on these facts, Justice Ceci
concluded that Connie was a mere observer of the accident, like Mrs.
Waube had been. Therefore, Connie's claim should be barred. 84
Justice Ceci also took issue with what he saw as Justice Callow's exten-
sion of the zone of danger rule. He stated that the zone of danger rule, as
set forth in Waube, does not include the question of "whether the plaintiff
was an observer of the accident or an object of the defendant's negligent
activities, but, rather, whether the plaintiff was in peril of physical im-
pact." 5 Applying the Waube zone of danger rule to the Garrett facts
would bar Connie Garrett from recovering. Justice Ceci stated that "in this
case, it is undisputed that Connie Garrett was never closer than fifteen to
twenty feet from the squad car that ran over her brother and was never in
danger of being injured herself." Therefore, this requirement would bar
Connie's claim.8 6
Moreover, Justice Ceci would also bar recovery, "because it is undis-
puted that Connie never feared for her own safety."87 Justice Ceci noted
that Justice Callow failed to apply the fear for the plaintiff's own safety
79. Id. at 243, 362 N.W.2d at 147.
80. Id. (quoting language from Justice Callow's opinion) (Ceci, J., dissenting). Justice Ceci
did not view the Garrett majority opinion as creating an exception to the zone of danger and fear
for one's own safety requirements. Instead, the justice took the view that the majority expanded






86. Id. at 244, 362 N.W.2d at 148.
87. Id.
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requirement and allowed "Connie's cause of action to stand despite the fact
that she never feared for her own safety." 88
Finally, Justice Ceci argued that Connie's claim for relief should have
been barred based on public policy considerations. Justice Callow set forth
six public policy considerations and concluded that Connie's claim was not
barred by any of them.89 However, Justice Ceci pointed out that several of
these public policy considerations are the basis for the zone of danger rule,
which he believed Justice Callow circumvented in this case.90 Justice Ceci
argued that the following public policy considerations which underlie the
zone of danger rule would bar Connie's claim: (1) the injury is too remote
from the negligence; (2) the injury is too wholly out of proportion to the
culpability of the negligent tort-feasor; (3) a legal precedent opening the
way to fraudulent claims would be set; and (4) a field with no sensible or
just stopping point would be entered.91 Justice Ceci concluded by saying
that he would affirm the summary judgment granted by the trial court
against Connie Garrett because she "was never in the field of danger, as is
required by Waube, and never feared for her own safety as is required by
Klassa."92 Moreover, Justice Ceci stated that Justice Callow's "deteriora-
tion of these requirements will open the way for fraudulent claims and will
enter a field with no sensible stopping point."'93
IV. ANALYSIS OF THE GARRETT OPINION
The Garrett court was faced with a compelling fact scenario for recovery
in which the existing rules governing negligent infliction of emotional dis-
tress would bar the plaintiff's claim. The majority conceded the fact that
Connie Garrett was not within the zone of danger, nor did she fear for her
own safety.94 The plurality opinion never argued that these requirements
were met. Instead of instituting a fundamental doctrinal change in the ba-
sic requirements of negligent infliction of emotional distress, Justice Callow
clung to the established rules, but as in La Fleur, created what may only be
characterized as an "exception." The exception applied to the Garrett facts
on the basis that Connie "was not merely an observer who was not directly
involved in the tortious activity," but "was an object of the police officer's
88. See supra note 56 for a list of public policy considerations in Wisconsin.
89. Id. at 233-34, 362 N.W.2d at 143.
90. See id. at 244, 362 N.W.2d at 148.
91. Id. at 245, 362 N.W.2d at 148 (quoting Waube v. Warrington, 216 Wis. 603, 613, 258
N.W. 497, 501 (1935)).
92. Id. at 246, 362 N.W.2d at 149.
93. Id.
94. Garrett v. City of New Berlin, 122 Wis. 2d 223, 228-29, 362 N.W.2d 137, 140 (1985).
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activities since she was a member of the group of children he was
pursuing."5
Like La Fleur, the Garrett decision demonstrates the "lawyers' adage
that hard cases make bad law." 96 The facts of Garrett were compelling
enough that six of the seven justices believed that Connie Garrett should
recover for her emotional distress. However, only three of the justices
thought that the facts of Garrett were distinguishable from Waube.97 Since
the facts of the two cases are so similar, the Garrett plurality holding will be
difficult to administer. Whether the Garrett plurality created an actual "ex-
ception," as in La Fleur, or whether the plurality intended a different result
is not clear. There are at least three possible ways in which the Garrett
plurality holding may affect the existing negligent infliction of emotional
distress requirements of zone of danger and fear for one's own safety.
First, Garrett could expand what is included within the existing require-
ments. This would mean that the fear for one's own safety requirement
would have been extended to include the plaintiff fearing for a third per-
son's safety. However, both the plaintiff and the third person must be mem-
bers of a group of people towards which the defendant's tortious conduct
was directed. Similarly, if the plurality was expanding the parameters of
the zone of danger rule, a plaintiff could now claim that while he was not in
the zone of danger, he was, nevertheless, a member of a group of people
who were the focus of the defendant's tortious conduct. However, the plu-
rality, by stating that it was not necessary to "modify or abandon" Waube
because it was "inapposite" with the Garrett facts,9 8 clearly demonstrated
their intent not to expand the zone of danger rule and, by analogy, the fear
for one's own safety requirement.
The second possible application of the Garrett holding is that the plural-
ity considered the zone of danger and fear for one's own safety require-
ments satisfied by the Garrett facts. If the majority's opinion is interpreted
as satisfying, without modifying, these requirements, they should theoreti-
cally remain unchanged. However, the fear for one's own safety require-
ment does not lend itself to such a liberal interpretation. It is one thing to
say that the zone of danger requirement always applied to persons who
were members of a group at which the defendant's negligence was directed;
95. Id. at 232, 362 N.W.2d at 142.
96. La Fleur v. Mosher, 109 Wis. 2d 112, 122, 325 N.W.2d 314, 319 (1982) (Steinmetz, J.,
dissenting).
97. Garrett, 122 Wis. 2d at 245, 362 N.W.2d at 149. Both Waube and Garrett involved plain-
tiffs who watched a close relative run down by a motor vehicle. In both cases the plaintiff was not
in the zone of danger and did not fear for her own safety.
98. Id. at 232, 362 N.W.2d at 142.
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it is quite another to make the leap from a requirement that a plaintiff fear
for his own safety, to include a plaintiff's fear for a third person's safety.
While Garrett arguably may not have changed the zone of danger require-
ment, the fear for one's own safety requirement could not have been applied
to the Garrett facts without modification or expansion.
However, the most likely application of Garrett is that the plurality ar-
rested the application of both the zone of danger and fear for one's own
safety requirements. If the plaintiff fits into the narrow facts of Garrett,
then the plaintiff will be excepted from the application of these two require-
ments. While the plurality does not state its exact position, the concurring
opinion does place the label of "exception" on the plurality's holding, while
the dissenting opinion regards the plurality as deteriorating the existing re-
quirements (i.e. expanding what is encompassed by the requirements).
If the facts of Garrett were changed slightly, would the plurality's excep-
tion still have yielded a favorable result for Connie Garrett? Would the
plurality have allowed Connie to recover had she just arrived at the drive-in
theater to tell her brother to come home with her, and if she were standing
on the other side of a four foot high stone wall (outside the theater) when
she witnessed the accident? This hypothetical would not make Connie a
member of the group of children the police officer was chasing, and there-
fore, the exception should not apply. Since Connie, in this example, as in
the actual case, did not fear for her own safety and was not in the zone of
danger, she should not be able to recover under the traditional requirements
regardless of what mental harm she suffered. However, the main difference
between this example and the actual case is only several feet, but the mental
harm to Connie would have almost certainly been the same. It is this type
of illogical and arbitrary result from the application of the zone of danger
rule that led the Dillon court to abandon it for more flexible guidelines.
While the zone of danger rule and the fear for one's own safety require-
ment were fairly fixed, the Garrett plurality removed whatever degree of
certainty existed regarding these requirements. A plaintiff who was not
within the zone of danger and did not fear for his or her own safety may
now attempt to argue that he or she was not a bystander, but a member of
the group at which the defendant's tortious activity was directed, and that
he or she feared for a group member's safety. The limits of the Garrett
exception are only constrained by the creativity of the plaintiff's lawyer.
For example, the Garrett exception was applied in Westcott v. Mikkelson,99
in which a mother sued her physician for negligent infliction of emotional
distress that resulted from an alleged negligent delivery and the resulting
99. 148 Wis. 2d 239, 434 N.W.2d 822 (Ct. App. 1988).
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death of her child a day later."° The trial court denied recovery because
the plaintiff was not in any danger and only feared for the safety of her
child. The court of appeals reversed the trial court and applied the Garrett
exception. The Westcott court stated that it could not "imagine a more
clear-cut example" in which the Garrett exception would apply "than a
mother giving birth to a child in distress."' 0 1
The appellate court in Westcott was, as in Garrett, faced with a plaintiff
whose claim merited recovery under traditional negligent infliction of emo-
tional distress rules. The Westcott court stated the case as a choice between
Waube and Garrett. To decide which precedent to apply, the court asked
itself whether Mrs. Westcott was an "observer or a participant."' 2 The
court concluded that Mrs. Westcott was a "participant," and therefore,
Garrett should apply.
The Westcott case demonstrates the difficulties a court has in trying to
interpret and apply the Garrett exception. The court's application of the
Garrett exception is probably in accordance with the Garrett plurality's
view, however, its interpretation and statement of the exception is inaccu-
rate. The Garrett exception does not analyze whether the plaintiff was a
participant, but whether the plaintiff was a member of a group of people at
which the defendant's tortious conduct was directed. 03 In Westcott, it is
unclear who else would have fit within the boundaries of the Garrett excep-
tion. The best example would be the father who was present when his child
was negligently delivered and subsequently died. Would the appellate court
have accepted the argument that the defendant's tortious conduct was di-
rected at the Westcott family as a whole, and therefore, accepted the father's
claim for relief? This argument is no less compelling than the Garrett plu-
rality basing Connie's claim for relief on the characterization that the po-
lice officer's tortious conduct was directed at the group of children of which
Connie was a member. Moreover, if in this example, the father did state a
claim for relief, there could be no justification for not allowing the plaintiff
in Waube to do likewise. It is unclear how far and in what directions the
Garrett exception extends.
After creating the "object of the tortious activity" exception, the Garrett
plurality examined whether public policy would prohibit Connie from
maintaining her cause of action. The three justices held that it would not.
100. Id. at 240, 434 N.W.2d at 822. The plaintiff's brief stated the child was born dead.
However, the complaint claimed the death occurred one day after birth. The infant was main-
tained on artificial life support for one day.
101. Id. at 242, 434 N.W.2d at 823.
102. Id.
103. See supra note 49 and accompanying text.
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What is significant about this is that the plurality used a Dillon-like analy-
sis. 1° The Dillon criteria which limit liability are: (1) whether the plaintiff
was located near the scene of the accident; (2) whether the shock to the
plaintiff resulted through a contemporaneous observance of the accident;
and (3) whether the plaintiff and the victim were closely related. The plu-
rality in Garrett singled out the facts that they considered most important in
Wisconsin's public policy analysis based upon the factors enunciated in
Morgan. The facts the plurality singled out were: (1) that Connie observed
the traumatic injuries suffered by Raymond from a distance of fifteen or
twenty feet; (2) that Connie was close enough to see the squad car run over
Raymond and witness his resulting injuries and severe pain; and (3) that
Connie was Raymond's older sister.'05 These facts mirror Dillon's policy
criteria exactly. Consequently, it could be questioned whether the plurality
has tacitly adopted the Dillon criteria as part of Wisconsin's public policy
consideration when the Garrett exception is applied to negligent infliction of
emotional distress.
The Garrett plurality viewed the Dillon guidelines as being created to
address "the problem of potential unlimited liability."' 06 The plurality's
conclusion from their Dillon-like public policy analysis is that allowing
Connie to recover for her emotional distress would not "be likely to open
the way for fraudulent claims or would enter a field with no sensible stop-
ping point."107 This parallel of the Dillon court's analysis is not surprising
when the facts of Dillon are examined. Dillon, like Garrett, involved a
plaintiff who was not within the zone of danger and did not fear for her own
safety. Mrs. Dillon and her daughter, Cheryl, watched the defendant negli-
gently kill Mrs. Dillon's other daughter, Erin.08 At trial, Mrs. Dillon was
barred from recovering because she was not within the zone of danger,
where, Cheryl, who may have been in the zone of danger, was allowed to
recover.'019 In rejecting the zone of danger rule, the California Supreme
Court stated that it could "hardly justify relief to the sister [Cheryl] for
trauma which she suffered.., and yet deny it to the mother merely because
of a happenstance that [Cheryl] was some few yards closer to the acci-
dent."" 0 The end result of the Dillon court's analysis was the formulation
of the guidelines discussed above. The Dillon guidelines were created for
104. See supra text accompanying note 56.
105. Garrett, 122 Wis. 2d at 234, 362 N.W.2d at 143.
106. Id. at 232, 362 N.W.2d at 142.
107. Id. at 234, 362 N.W.2d at 143.
108. Dillon v. Legg, 441 P.2d 912, 913 (1968).
109. Id. at 915.
110. Id. at 915.
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the purpose of replacing the zone of danger and fear for one's own safety
requirements. The Garrett plurality's tacit application of the Dillon guide-
lines, while at the same time embracing the zone of danger rule and fear for
one's own safety requirement, demonstrates a Janus quality in their
analysis.
The last criterion the Garrett plurality examined was the requirement
that there be physical manifestations of Connie's mental injuries. The trial
court found no physical manifestations of Connie's alleged mental injuries.
However, the Garrett plurality, confronted with a worthy plaintiff, manipu-
lated the physical manifestation requirement to find it satisfied. Connie tes-
tified in her deposition that she suffered a post-accident state of hysteria,
insomnia for two months, disruption of her family relationship, and a drop
in her school grades. This behavior demonstrated two types of mental reac-
tions to a traumatic event."1 Connie's hysteria at the scene of the accident
demonstrated a "primary" response to the witnessing of the accident. Pri-
mary reactions occur "automatically and instinctively, as, for example,
when the individual is put in great personal danger or is forced to witness"
the death of a loved one.112 In addition, Connie appeared to have suffered
several "secondary" reactions that may be termed "traumatic neuroses,"
which are caused by "an individual's continued inability to adequately ad-
just to a traumatic event." '13 Connie's insomnia, disruption of her family
relationship, and drop in her school grades could be viewed as secondary
reactions to the witnessing of the accident.
The Garrett plurality consulted a medical dictionary to determine if
Connie Garrett's post-accident behavior evidenced any recognized physical
manifestations of her alleged mental injuries. The plurality focused on the
primary reactions to determine if Connie demonstrated any physical mani-
festations and discounted the secondary reactions. The plurality stated that
"it is doubtful that a disruption of one's family relationship or a drop in
grades could constitute a physical manifestation of emotional distress,
[however], hysteria is recognized as such a physical manifestation." 1 4 The
Garrett court's emphasis on primary reactions fails to fully realize the total-
ity of a person's possible mental injuries. Both primary and secondary reac-
tions must be examined to obtain a total picture of the harm that was done
to the plaintiff. "It is much clearer that secondary reactions can be ex-
tremely detrimental to the individual. Despite their often subtle nature,
111. See Comment, supra note 14, at 1249.
112. Id.
113. Id. at 1250.
114. Garrett, 122 Wis. 2d at 236, 362 N.W.2d at 144.
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neuroses can produce severe disability, interference with normal functions,
and impairment in the daily satisfaction of life; and... a patient's thinking
and feeling .... .""' The Garrett plurality's "medical dictionary test"
greatly eroded what filtering effect the physical manifestation requirement
was intended to serve. A plaintiff's lawyer will now only have to search for
the medical dictionary that best describes his or her client's mental injuries.
The physical manifestation requirement may have screened some plaintiffs
before Garrett, however, after Garrett, the requirement no longer poses
much of an obstacle.
V. A RECOMMENDATION FOR FUNDAMENTAL CHANGE
The Wisconsin Supreme Court has backed itself into a corner by creat-
ing a web of arbitrary rules that are unrealistic and do not allow recovery
for all clearly deserving plaintiffs. The Garrett case served to highlight the
shortcomings of the traditional rules." 6 In both La Fleur and Garrett, the
court was confronted with plaintiffs whom the court genuinely felt should
recover for their emotional distress. However, in both cases, the inflexibil-
ity of the traditional requirements would bar the plaintiff's claim. To allow
these plaintiffs to bring their claims, the court has ignored its own rules and
created narrow exceptions. How long can the Wisconsin Supreme Court
continue to pull bricks out of the foundation of the traditional requirements
before these requirements collapse on them? Recommending a new set of
arbitrary requirements in this Comment would only serve to redraw the
arbitrary lines and be subject to the same criticism as the traditional re-
quirements." 7 An illustration of this is demonstrated in California's expe-
rience with negligent infliction of emotional distress. For years the
California Supreme Court followed the zone of danger and fear for one's
own safety rules.1"' However, recognizing the requirements' inadequacies,
the California Supreme Court created in Dillon a set of new requirements,
discussed earlier, that were intended to replace the former criteria. These
new requirements were intended to determine the existence of a duty in
bystander negligent infliction of emotional distress cases. However, in sub-
sequent cases, the California Supreme Court realized the inadequacy of this
new set of arbitrary rules and relegated them to mere guidelines that were
to be considered by the court, but which were not to be determinative." 9
115. See Comment, supra note 14, at 1252.
116. Garrett v. City of New Berlin, 122 Wis. 2d 223, 362 N.W.2d 137 (1985).
117. Bass v. Nooney Co., 646 S.W.2d 765, 771 (1983).
118. Amaya v. Home Ice, Fuel and Supply Co., 379 P.2d 513 (1963), overruled by Dillon v.
Legg, 441 P.2d 912 (1968).
119. Milien v. Kaiser Found. Hosp., 616 P.2d 813, 816 (1980).
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The Garrett concurring opinion states the most realistic and compelling
approach to negligent infliction of emotional distress cases. The concurring
opinion treats mental harm in the same manner as physical harm. Chief
Justice Heffernan, who wrote the concurring opinion, argued that the negli-
gent infliction of emotional distress analysis be based only on the most fun-
damental tort principals of duty, breach, causation, and damages.12 The
zone of danger and fear for one's own safety requirements have "no place in
modem Wisconsin negligence law."1 21 These requirements are excluded
from the analysis because, "where there is a negligent act, there is liability
in respect to anyone who is in fact injured by the negligence."1 22 Liability
should not be examined in an "artificial way, such as saying that there can
be no liability for one out of the 'zone of danger,' because in the event a
plaintiff is injured in any way, that plaintiff is in fact within the 'zone of
danger.' ",123 While the zone of danger and fear for one's own safety re-
quirements were created to address the dual fears of fraudulent claims and
unlimited liability, these fears do not go unchecked in the concurring opin-
ion's approach. What is gone is the arbitrary and unrealistic requirements
that inadequately addressed these considerations. Under Wisconsin law,
the proper place for these considerations is not in the duty analysis, but
rather after the jury has found liability. 2 4 Whether to preclude liability in
a given set of facts would be a case by case determination to be made by the
court after a finding of liability by the jury. '2 5 Chief Justice Heffernan was
in favor of allowing Connie Garrett to recover, not because she fell within
the parameters of arbitrary requirements like zone of danger and fear for
one's own safety, but because she could prove duty, breach, causation, and
damages. In addition, there was no public policy consideration that should
bar her claim.
The concurring opinion's approach to negligent infliction of emotional
distress is neither revolutionary nor startling, but only follows the general
approach to negligence cases in Wisconsin. The supreme courts of seven
jurisdictions have adopted approaches similar to what Chief Justice Heifer-
nan proposed to govern negligent infliction of emotional distress cases. 26
120. Garrett, 122 Wis. 2d at 241, 362 N.W.2d at 146.
121. Id. at 239, 362 N.W.2d at 145.
122. Id.
123. Id. at 239, 362 N.W.2d at 145-46.
124. Antoniewicz v. Reszcynski, 70 Wis. 2d 836, 857, 236 N.W.2d 1, 11 (1975).
125. Id.
126. The following jurisdictions have dropped the zone of danger, fear for one's own safety,
and physical manifestation requirements: Alabama, California, Connecticut, Hawaii, Missouri,
Montana, and Ohio. See Taylor v. Baptist Medical Center Inc., 400 So. 2d 369 (Ala. 1981);
Molien v. Kaiser Found. Hosp., 616 P.2d 813 (Cal. 1980); Montinieri v. Southern New England
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The California Supreme Court, in Molien v. Kaiser Foundation Hospital,1 27
stated that "[t]he essential question is one of proof, whether the plaintiff has
suffered a serious and compensable injury should not turn on... [an] artifi-
cial and often arbitrary classification scheme."' 28 In addition, the Molien
court stated that the existence of a mental injury "is a matter of proof to be
presented to the trier of fact."' 29 The screening of claims based on a classi-
fication scheme at the "pleading stage is usurpation of the jury's func-
tion."13  The concurring opinion in Garrett mirrors this shift from
arbitrary requirements to reliance on the jury as the filtering mechanism.
Chief Justice Heffernan argued that the question is factual and "[i]t is for
the jury to decide whether injury, physical or emotional, has been proved
and was caused by the defendant's negligence."' 3'
In addition to arguing for the rejection of the zone of danger and fear
for one's own safety requirements, the Chief Justice would also eliminate
the physical manifestation requirement. 132 The Wisconsin Supreme Court
has justified this requirement in negligent infliction of emotional distress
cases as a way to guarantee genuine claims. However, in Alsteen v. Gehl,'33
the Wisconsin Supreme Court has recognized that while the physical mani-
festation requirement was needed in the past because "we lacked techniques
for gathering reliable information about psychological experience, we now
... can intelligently evaluate claims of emotional injury."' 134 The Alsteen
court continued by saying that "[p]sychiatry and clinical psychology, while
not exact sciences, can provide sufficiently reliable information relating to
the extent of psychological stress, and to the causal relationship between the
injury and the defendant's conduct, to enable a trier of fact to make intelli-
gent valuative judgments on a plaintiff's claim." 135 While Justice Wilkie
made these statements for the majority in Aisteen in reference to intentional
infliction of emotional distress, in the dissent in Ver Hagen, he argued for
their extension to negligent infliction of emotional distress cases. In Ver
Hagen, Justice Wilkie argued that "[t]here is no longer any reason in logic
Telephone Co., 398 A.2d 1180 (Conn. 1978); Rodrigues v. State, 472 P.2d 509 (Haw. 1970); Bass
v. Nooney Co., 646 S.W.2d 765 (Mo. 1983); Johnson v. Supersave Markets Inc., 686 P.2d 209
(Mont. 1984); Shultz v. Barberton Glass Co., 447 N.E.2d 109 (Ohio 1983).
127. 616 P.2d 813 (1980).
128. Id. at 821.
129. Id.
130. Id.
131. Garrett, 122 Wis. 2d at 241, 362 N.W.2d at 146.
132. Id.
133. 21 Wis. 2d 349, 124 N.W.2d 312 (1963).
134. Id. at 359, 124 N.W.2d at 317.
135. Id.
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or in fact to distinguish between intentional or negligent infliction of emo-
tional distress" because "[t]he damage is equally real whatever name is
applied."' 13
6
However, Wisconsin, while dropping most of the requirements for in-
tentional infliction of emotional distress, still retained the nebulous require-
ment that the emotional distress must be severe. The purpose of the
requirement is to prevent claims based on emotional distress that might be
trivial. This screening effect could be equally served by the plaintiff's law-
yer, the jury, and the judge's application of public policy. The plaintiff's
lawyer, who often works on a contingent fee basis, would not be likely to
pursue a plaintiff's case if the only claim for relief was a de minimis emo-
tional distress claim. For the plaintiff's lawyer to pursue a marginal claim
would not be in his or her own financial interest, nor in the best interests of
the client who would have to suffer through the rigors of a jury trial. The
jury would also act as a screening mechanism by eliminating marginal
claims where plaintiffs fail to prove all the elements of their claim. In addi-
tion, the jury would award nominal damages for plaintiffs only proving
nominal injuries. The third level of protection from trivial claims is the
judge's ability on a motion after verdict to preclude liability in a given case
based on the policy factors enunciated in Morgan.
As was stated before, there is nothing extraordinary or revolutionary
about the approach to negligent infliction of emotional distress set forth in
the Garrett concurring opinion. Waube and its progeny, by creating what is
in effect a limited duty, are "contrary to the accepted Wisconsin tort juris-
prudence."' 3 7 "It is time we dispense with the automatic and irrational
application of the liability limiting formulations that the majority attempts
to distinguish but at the same time fervently embraces."' 38
VI. CONCLUSION
Garrett v. City of New Berlin presented the Wisconsin Supreme Court
with a case that offered a chance to eliminate the outdated and arbitrary
negligent infliction of emotional distress requirements of zone of danger,
136. Ver Hagen v. Gibbons, 47 Wis. 2d 220, 228, 177 N.W.2d 83, 87 (1970) (Willde, J.,
dissenting).
137. Meracle v. Children's Serv. Soc'y of Wisconsin, 149 Wis. 2d 19, 34, 437 N.W.2d 532,
538 (1989). The holding of Waube, which is based on the majority rationale in Palsgraffv. Long
Island R.R., 162 N.E. 99 (N.Y. 1928) has been repudiated on numerous occasions by the Wiscon-
sin Supreme Court. See, eg., Coffey v. City of Milwaukee, 74 Wis. 2d 526, 537-38, 247 N.W.2d
132, 138 (1976); Antoniewicz v. Reszcynski, 70 Wis. 2d 836, 857, 236 N.W.2d 1, 11 (1975);
Schilling v. Stockel, 26 Wis. 2d 525, 531-32, 133 N.W.2d 335, 338 (1965).
138. Garrett, 122 Wis. 2d at 242, 362 N.W.2d at 147.
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fear for one's own safety, and physical manifestations. By rejecting doctri-
nal change, the plurality has added to the arbitrariness of the existing re-
quirements. Cases will continue to arise that present a clearly deserving
plaintiff who does not fit within the traditional requirements or exceptions.
The Wisconsin Supreme Court is likely to continue to either manipulate the
existing rules or create additional exceptions to them, to allow deserving
plaintiffs to pursue a claim for relief.
Wisconsin, which is usually at the forefront of legal development, has
stood by and watched the law governing negligent infliction of emotional
distress develop in other jurisdictions. The deep division in the Wisconsin
Supreme Court has left Wisconsin on the brink of change for more than
half a decade. The Garrett plurality has, through its own reasoning,
demonstrated the shortcomings and arbitrary nature of the existing negli-
gent infliction of emotional distress requirements. Chief Justice Heffernan,
in the Garrett concurring opinion, has detailed a path that recognizes both
the advances in the mental health profession and the need for fundamental
doctrinal change. Only through purging the law of the zone of danger, fear
for one's own safety, and physical manifestation requirements, will the law
be given stability and coherence. It is time to rethink and fundamentally
change Wisconsin's current approach to negligent infliction of emotional
distress. The fears of the Waube court, based on the then current insuffi-
ciencies in the developing mental health profession, no longer hold true and
should not serve to hinder plaintiffs more than one-half a century later.
JOHN A. GOLDSTEIN
[Vol. 75:467
